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On December 15, 1938 the British High Commissioner in South Africa 
Sir W.H. Clark promulgated two related and radical proclamations 
affecting the British Crown Colony of Lesotho, then anglisized as 
Basutoland. Proclamation No. 61, the Native Administration Proclamation' 
provided that the High Commissioner, following a consultation with the 
King of Basotho (arbitrarily styled Paramount Chief by the British 
colonial order) could declare any person to be Principal Chief, Ward 
Chief, Chief or Headman in the Territory. Section 3 of the Proclamation 
specifically gave the High Commissioner the powers to revoke or vary the 
appointments of Chiefs. The functions of the chieftaincy were specifically 
defined and its powers reduced. Chiefs were brought fully under the 
machinery of the colonial administration and their numbers cut down from 
about 2,500 to 1,340. In the District of Maseru, for instance, where 
under the jurisdictions of four Chiefs (Sekhonyana, Seeiso, Maama, 
Khoabane) and the King there were 108 subchiefs and 597 Headmen in 1928, 
the colonial administration had proposed a reduction to 27 sub-Chiefs 
and 87 Headmen. And in Mokhotlong, the smallest District in Lesotho,
the total number of Chiefs and Headmen was reduced from 128 to 74 in
21938. Proclamation No. 62, the Native Courts Proclamation provided for 
the "recognition, constitution, powers and jurisdiction of Native 
Courts and generally for the administration of justice within" the 
Territory. Section 2 of the Proclamation specifically gave the Resident 
Commissioner powers" to suspend, cancel or vary any warrant recognising 
or establishing a Native Court or defining the jurisdiction of any such 
Court or the limits within which such jurisdiction may be exercised.""'
Effectively, legitimation to the offices of Chief and Headman was 
removed from the Lekhotla la Mahosana - the Grand Council of Lesotho, 
composed mainly of the scions of Moshoeshoe, the founder of the Basotho 
Kingdom, and accordingly styled "the Sons of Moshoeshoe - and put in 
the hands of the British executive, the High Commissioner. The office 
of the King of Basotho thus suffered considerably in authority and 
prestige. Courts had been a major source of revenue for Chiefs and 
Headmen. They ate the fines from their judgements and reserved the right 
to keep stray animals for personal purposes once the fact was established 
that no one came forth to claim them. In this regard also the reduction 
of courts meant the reduction in the financial power of the chieftaincy.
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Aside from limited references in two Colonial Reports, Sir Alan 
Pirn’s Financial and Economic Position of Basutoland, 1935 and Lord 
Hailey's Native Administration in the British African Territories, 1953, 
no researcher that I am aware of, in any discipline for that matter, 
has attempted research on the factors that led to those Reforms.
Releasing his Report just three years before the Reforms, Pim is relevant 
in the subject only in so far as he seems to have convinced the colonial 
administration that the "fundamental defects" of the indigenous govern­
ment, which needed to be addressed, rested on the fact of "the multipli­
cation of Courts as Chiefs increased in number indefinitely, and 
partial dependence of those Chiefs for an income on the fines inflicted
4in their Courts". This diagnosis is infinitely quoted by those whose 
research has to refer to the Reforms. Even Lord Hailey, who devotes two 
and half pages on the causes, and who otherwise criticizes the Reforms, 
particularly the adoption of the "Native Administration" system as a 
borrowing from Nigeria and Tanganyika (Tanzania)nevertheless remains 
comfortable with Pirn's analysis of what had gone wrong in the indige­
nous government at that time. As the paper will reveal, what Pim 
referred to as the "fundamental defects" were only superficial manifes­
tations of a more complex problem.
I will attempt with this paper to achieve two objectives. First,
I will attempt to show that, albeit the Reforms of 1938 were 
officially initiated by the High Commissioner, through the Resident 
Commissioner of Lesotho, that was so essentially because the constitu­
tional responsibility for such a move rested on the colonial executive. 
The need for some type of reforms had otherwise been felt and the 
pressure for legislation been exterted by Commoners in the Territory to 
restore a sense of justice and political responsibility in their 
traditional rulers - the Chiefs and Headmen. Second, I will attempt 
to show that the loss of justice and political responsibility towards 
Commoners which the Chiefs and Headmen snowed, were themselves largely 
owing to the fact that the indigenous government (Basotho rulers and 
their institutions of rule) had broken down. It had broken down owing 
to a number of factors, some of which were inherent to the nature of 
the colonial state, while others were a reflection of in-built weak­
nesses in the indigenous government which gave under the pressure of 
modern political, economic and social conditions.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PARALLEL GOVERNMENT IN LESOTHO
Puzzled by the way Lesotho, a “Crown Colony", had been ruled,
Sir Alan Pim remarked in 1935, with remarkable accuracy and clarity in 
6this regard:
The history of Basutoland presents a very different picture 
and the Protectorate policy followed with reference to it 
. has little in common with indirect rule. It has been a 
policy “of non-interference, of proffering alliance, of 
leaving two parallel Governments to work in a state of 
detachment unknown in tropical Africa, while under indirect 
rule native institutions are incorporated into a single 
system of government and subjected to the continuous 
guidance, supervision and stimulus of European officers.
Pim, however, was unable to go behind his own statement for an explana-
nation. The explanation, as I will show, lay in the lack of clarity
surrounding the constitutional position of Lesotho under British 
hegemony. Was it a Crown Colony, or was it a Protectorate? Confusion 
on this question would be the basis ofour problem.
From the outset, when Lesotho became a British Colony on March 12, 
1886, the constitutional role of Chiefs in the Territory
was a confused affair. Form the wording of the High Commisioner,
Sir Phillip Wodehouse's Proclamation on that date, it seemed as though 
in terms of British constitutional law Lesotho had become a Crown 
Colony by cession.7
I do hereby proclaim and declare that from and after the 
publication hereof, the said Tribe (i.e. Nation) of the 
Basutos shall be and shall be taken to be for all intents
and purposes, British Subjects; and the Territory of the
said Tribe shall be and be taken to be British Territory.
If Lesotho had thus become a Crown Colony, it meant that Moshoeshoe's 
sovereignty and that of his heirs had been ceded and the authority of 
the British Corwn over the Territory was unimpaired? And if so, 
ideally there should have been no indigenous government as such - a 
political structure with a leadership that for all intents and purposes 
continued to rule as it had in the pre-colonial era.
But his is not exactly the way constitutionally that the Colony was
conceived. In the first place, there was doubt on the part of the
British Government itself as to whether the High Commissioner’s
Proclamation had had the legal effect of constituting Lesotho as a
Colony. For in May 1886, over two months after the High Commissioner’s
Proclamation, the British Crown Law Officers still expressed the opinion
that on the strict interpretation of the law Lesotho had not yet become
a British dominion, and that its cession would be valid only if it was
“duly authorised by the Queen and recognised by his (High Commissioner’s)
9creation as Governor, or in some like manner." So that it may be 
argued that until Lesotho was annexed by an Act to the Cape of Good Hope 
Colony in 1871, the legality of British rule over it was questionable.^
In the second place, and more to the point the King Moshoeshoe had 
written the High Commissioner Phillip Wodehouse a letter on April 21,
1886 requesting that Lesotho should be treated as a "special Territory"
- "a Native reserve where natives alone should be allowed to dwell and 
which would be dependent from the High Commissioner."11 Moshoeshoe 
essentially sought to retain his sovereignty and his land. He needed 
the High Commissoner as only a British Agent shielding him form Free 
State Boer aggression. And in that regard, he was consciously attempt­
ing to achieve an objective for his kingdom which he had earlier propo­
sed to the same High Commissioner.
In 1862, three years before the pressures of war with the Boers 
weakened his negotiations with the British government, he had intimated 
to Wodehouse the desire for a relationship with his Home Government in
J 2which
I am like a man who has a house, the man rules the house 
and all that is in it, and the Government rules him. My 
"house" is Basutoland. So that the Queen rules my people 
only through me ... I shall be like a blind man, but when 
he (a British Agent placed in the Kingdom) directs me I 
shall be considered wise ... I wish to govern my own people 
by native law, by our own laws, but if the Queen wishes 
after this to introduce other laws into my conntry,
I would be willing, but I should wish such laws to be 
submitted to the Council of the Basutos, and When they are 
accepted by my Council, I will send to the Queen and 
inform her that they have become law. (My emphasis.)
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This proposal, when it was submitted at the King's Grand Council, 
was espoused by "the great majority" of the principal men in the 
Kingdom* territorial chiefs and Moshoeshoe’s senior sons.
These same “principal men" were privy to their King’s overture of 
April 21, 1886 to Sir Phillip Wodehouse requesting him to qualify his 
Proclamation of March 12. If Wodehouse agreed to Moshoeshoe's request, 
it seemed in the King’s mind and that of his Grand Council that he 
would tacitly have granted the Kingdom the ante-bellum constitutional 
arrangement proposed in 1862. Such an arrangement was more in keeping 
with a Protectorate than with a Crown Colony status.
Although Wodehouse did not then put it in writing, meantime he 
had left South Africa in May, while Moshoeshoe had passed away on 
March 11, 1870, his response had been in the affirmative. And when
later in 1880 the difficulties of the Gun War necessitated that this
response be made clear to all concerned, Wodehouse came out of retire­
ment with a memorandum in which he stated, when asked if he had 
intended "Basutoland for Basutos only":1”*
I can only reply, that such was the very thing to the
attainment of which all my efforts were directed - it 
was for the purpose of putting an end to Border disputes, 
and for removing doubts as to the true limi^| of the 
Territory to which the claim of that Tribe, and that 
alone, should be admitted for the future, that these 
negotiations were carried on .... The object 
was to secure peace and comfort for the Basutos in the 
future ...
To this statement one can only add that until Wodehouse committed 
himself to writing the Colonial Office in London was wont to referring 
to Lesotho variously as " a kind of outlaying territory with a High 
Commission constitution," "an inchoate Crown colony waiting for 
annexation to one of its neighbours," "the protectorate under Imperial 
Government." And at one instance, much later in 1883, speaking in the 
House of Commons in his capacity as Secretary of State the Earl of 
Derby could still affirm: "We don’t propose to make Basutoland a
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Crown Colony, or introduce the costly machinery of European officers.
We wish the Basutos to enjoy Home Rule in the strictest sense of the
^ J 5word."
It is this confusion overthe constitutional status of the Territoty 
that led to parallel government. On the one hand there was the 
colonial administration, which in 1884 comprised of thirteen officers 
and a police force of 159, of whom nineteen were Europeans. By 1900 
the staff composed of the Resident Commissioner, Government Secretary, 
seven District Assistant Commissioners each in charge of a District, 
four medical Officers and a police force of 259 (for a population of 
about 264,000 inhabitants) responsible to a British High Commissioner 
resident in Cape Town. On the other hand there was the indigenous 
government of Basotho Chiefs, Headmen and institutions of government 
which remained virtually in full command in the management and mismanage­
ment of the internal administrative and judicial affairs of the 
Territory. For as long as there was not conflict of authority the 
colonial administration emphasized British "protection" in its rela­
tions with the indigenous government. In the event of conflict, 
however, especially where the latter pretended to greater powers in 
the partnership, the colonial administration emphasized the sterner 
Crown Colony aspect. Such was the time, as late as in 1951 when
the first Queen Regent in the history of Lesotho, 'Mantsebo Seeiso, 
cautioned a Resident Commissioner that "the Government please hold 
in abeyance any action which might tend to indicate the taking upon 
itself(sic) powers which are not included in the terms of the covenant 
of the alliance and protection between the late Moshesh the Wise and 
Victoria the Good The Resident Commissioner retorted;1^
I was placed here to govern this country and I mean 
to do just that. The fact that Her Majesty, Queen 
Victoria, in her greatness of heart consented to 
govern through the Paramount Chief and Chiefs, and 
that here successors have done so, and will probably 
continue to do so, appears to have blinded you to 
the fact that His Majesty can rule His Basuto 
subjects as he pleases.
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Following Lesotho's disannexation from the Cape of Good Hope
Colony in 1884, as a consequence of the Cape misrule and the resultant
Gun War, provisions were inserted in the famous Proclamation 2B of
1884 which, if implemented, might have ended that parallel government.
Chief among those provisions were that Basotho Chiefs would be appointed
by the Resident Commissioner. The Resident Commissioner authorised
them to adjudicate on cases, criminal or civil. He was empowered to
make Rules defining the jurisdictions of all Basotho courts in the 
1 8land. However, so soon after the conclusion of a war in which the 
indigenous government had vanc^iished a British settler colpny, it was 
apparently found imprudent to risk another confrontation with Basotho 
by implementing those provisions. The provisions were shelved and 
forgotten until 1922 when for the first time the colonial administration, 
responding to pressure coming from Commoners, considered "resurrecting" 
them, to use the language of the threatened Basotho rulers in their 
moment of political agony.
Now, at least one study in Nigeria has been picked as an example
to show that even "indirect rule in the hands of incompetent colonial
hands could degenerate into maladministration far more rapidly than 
1 9direct rule. I hope to demonstrate in the next section, how parallel 
rule in the constitutionally ill-defined "Colony" of Lesotho, where in 
reality the colonial administration operated from instinct rather than 
from policy, an otherwise pre-industrial indigenous government 
surrounded by the mercantile Boer and Briton settler colonies of 
South Africa broke down from internal and external stress.
THE INDIGENOUS GOVERNMENT BREAKS DOWN
The Political Factor: Dynastic Feuds
The Gun War (September 1880 to April 1881), perhaps more than any 
other single factor, unleashed the pent-up dynastic conflicts in 
Lesotho and thereby contributed to the weakening and ultimate break 
down of the indigenous government. The Achilles heel in the ruling order 
was the King of Basotho, Mohato Letsie, Moshoeshoe's heir-
Mohato was no comparison to his father as a monarch. Blind in one 
eye and cripple of one hand - at a time that a monarch could still be 
expected to take up his position on the battleground, he had physical 
disabilities that weighed heavily on his mind as well as on his 
following. He was a brave man, but his pluck was moderated by that 
painful reality. His relations with his wise father had never been 
cordial, the father's love being blatantly tipped in favour of the 
second son Molapo, to the point of personally building a first house 
(legatha) for the latter, which had not been done for the heir. He 
seemed to have received no personal attention and preparation for the 
throne which Moshoeshoe had abundantly been given by the wiser predeces­
sor Mohlomi, the son of Monyane. When a few days before his death at
the age of 84 Moshoeshoe finally gave him the scepter, Mohato was a 59
20year old man and already or soon to be "troubled by gout".
At the break of the Gun War in September 1880, the new King was 
presiding over an already sharply divided royal house. As observed by 
the Cape Colony Government, to which divisions in the leadership of 
Basotho were of military interesc, there were factions in the
core of the royal lineage of the Territory. The first faction, headed 
by the King himself, featured his warrior brother Chief Masopha, and 
the King's sons Lerotholi - the heir, Bereng and Maama. The second, 
headed by Jonathan Molapo, featured Moshoeshoe's educated junior sons -
21Nehemiah Sekhonyana, Sofonea, George and Tsekelo, and of Chief Potsane. 
(Chief Molapo had just passed away on May 31. His eldest son and heir 
Josefa was mentally demented. By default therefore, the second son 
Jonathan had assumed the leadership of that powerful house.)
The issue in the Gun War was whether or not Basotho would obey 
the Cape Colony Government disarmament Act and hand in their guns to 
their Resident Commissioner. The second faction of the royal house 
complied and so fought the war on the side of the Government as "loyals." 
Largely owing to King Letsie's dual role in the war, his own faction 
suffered a further cleavage. Letsie professed his loyalty to the 
Government and handed in his guns. The rest in the faction, led by 
Masopha, defied the Government and were declared "rebels." Yet, at the 
same time it was attested that the King of Basotho was carrying on a
"secret instigation" against disarmament and was "really only pretending
22to be the friend of the Government."
If Letsie used his dual role as a military strategy, he lost the 
battle, to both the Cape Governemnt and the "rebels”. In the end; both 
parties seem to have concluded that he was indecisive and without a 
backbone. And indeed, at major points in the course of the war the King 
seemed either to have exercised very poor judgement or to have underated 
the fact that once shed, royal dignity is difficult to adorn. Witness 
the following episode, being one of those which oral evidence submits in 
the King's favour as showing how well he played this dual role. On July 
8, 1880 Letsie entrusted an obviously undervalued arsenal of 9 guns in 
a Scotch cart to his loyalist half-brother Nehemiah Sekhonyana to hand 
over to the Resident Commissioner at the Territory's capital Maseru.
Just one hundred yards off from the royal residence, at 12 o'clock mid­
day, the Scotch cart was raided, by the King's own junior sons, personally 
driving the Scotch cart against their resistance. Ultimately, about a
thousand yards from the royal residence the sons still made away with
23all the guns. As tradition goes, the King had so ordered his sons to
24take the guns away from him. If at all a strategy, the episode was 
unseemly.
This and other similar episodes led the Cape Government to
conclude that the King had lost control of his own government. One
25colonial Officer referred to him as "an old woman." His warrior 
brother and independentist, Masopha criticised him for acting unconstitu­
tionally and instructing the Nation to hand in guns before the matter 
had been decided by a national pitso^  and guite clearly felt that he 
was a coward.
Masopha therefore eternally parted ways with Letsie. Until his
death in 1891, a decade after the war, Letsie could not bring the war
here under his authority. Masopha was only eventually subdued by
Letsie's heir Lerotholi in 1898, ]ust a year before he (Masopha) died
at the advanced ago of seventy eight. He had taken Chief Maama
permanently with him from the King’s faction. Maama was twice related
to him by marriage: He had married two of the uncle's daughters, and
in turn one of Maama's daughters, Mpinane 'Mamathe was married to 
27Masopha's heir, Lepoqo.
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Lerotholi had also fought the war on his uncle Masopha's side.
But after the war he returned to his father's fold. It was infinitely
in his interests to do. His younger brother Maama, from Letsie's
third house, was a claimant to the throne, strongly backed by Chief
Masopha. Additionally, Letsie had on considerations of consanguinity
a much softer spot for the younger son, Maama‘s monther, Marutsoana
('Ma Maama), being the King's own sister, offspring from Moshoeshoe's
loins by an affair. By returning to his father's fold Lerotholi hoped
at least to win the royal court to his side. And he succeeded. For
when finally the doting King attempted to proclaim the younger Maama
before a Grand Council, shortly before his death in 1891, the Council
was so strong in favour of Lerotholi that one courtier dared to tell
28the King: "Letsie u'a hlanya - you are mad."
Upon Lerotholi's succession, however, Maama stayed a thorn on the 
young King's flesh, constantly provoking bloodshed, until Lerotholi's 
death in 1905.
The duel between Jonathan and his half brother Joel Molapo over
their late father's property and junior wives also came to the surface
during the Gun War and it was dignified by it. While Jonathan had
fought the war as a "loyalist", Joel was a “rebel". Yet the duel was
to continue spasmcoically into the nineteenth century, shedding its
original causes as it matured and giving the appearance of a contest
for the chieftaincy of Leribe District. The duel was to be dignified
again by the Anglo-Boer War. When the Boers enticed Basotho to their
side Joel was the first to defy the Lesotho colonial administration
and seize the opportunity. But his motive was clear from the start.
Upon receiving his supply of Mauser rifles from the Free State he set
out, in the words of an Assistant Commissioner in his District, "to
promote a tumult in Basutoland by raking up the embers of the old feud
29between the children of Molapo." He attacked Chief Hlasoa, who was 




On that occasion, however, Joel was tried for treason by a 
combined court of King Lerotholi and his Resident Commissioner and 
fined £2,000 in lieu of 500 head of cattle, on top of a jail sentence 
of one year.^° The King got £200 of the fine, the rest going to the 
central treasury of the colonial administration. As it was often the
case in those days, when a chief got injured his people bled on his
behalf: The £2,000 that Joel paid came from his subjects.
In 1914 it was Jonathan's turn for "raking up the embers".
Jonathan raided Joel’s flock, burned his subjects* houses and returned 
with 1,716 cattle, 7,942 goats, 5,794 sheep and 418 horses, mostly the 
property of common people, and three men lost their lives. A combined 
court of the King and the Resident Commissioner - the "two oxen pull­
ing under the same yoke," as Basotho Kings put it, tried the Chief of 
Leribe for manslaughter and disturbing the peace. He was fined 
£4,341, in lieu of 1,000 head of cattle, which he paid through 
contributions from his subjects. The King, then Griffith Lerotholi , 
kept £634 of it, the rest going to the central treasury of the colonial 
administration. In addition, Jonathan was ordered to pay £8,000 to 
Joel in damages.^1
The Joel-Jonathan feud only came to an end on Joel's death on 
March 24, 1919. Yet, even then the old "rebel"‘s funeral took place 
amidst dynastic disputes. King Griffith and his faction were insisting 
that Joel be given the supreme honour in the royal house of being 
buried next to the revered Moshoeshoe on top of Thaba Bosiu. But, 
having fallen intensely in love with his brother in death, Jonathan 
won the battle to bury him closer to him in his own District. Every 
single Chief in the King's faction stayed away from the funeral. At
the grave site "Chief Jonathan said a few words and then broke down in
. 32gnei . “
Joel's funeral boycott by the Matsieng faction was a reflection of 
an even more serious and disruptive dynastic feud between Jonathan and 
the King. And that feud represented the high-water mark of a break­
down in the indigenous government.
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To begin with, from the reign of Letsie 1, Jonathan's relations 
with the senior house in Matsieng had never been cordial. The Chief 
of Leribe always felt that the senior house had never forgiven him 
for the role that he had played in the Gun war and so he often over­
reacted to any queries coming from his kings. Yet the disputes he had 
with his juniors in the District unavoidably invited Matsieng's 
intervention. And, as in other districts throughout the country, these 
were many. In Leribe, in addition to the duel with Joel, Jonathan was 
constantly in arms with Chief Motsoene, his mentally demented brother’s 
son, who claimed seniority over the uncle in the chieftaincy of the 
District. Additionally, Jonathan's own sons, Mathealira and Motsarapane, 
both pretenders to their father's office, were already fighting it out 
in arms. Nevertheless, until Lerotholi's successor, Letsie 11, died 
in 1913, the Leribe-Matsieng friction was not personalised.
However, when Griffith succeded to office, the stage for a sharp 
conflict was set. Letsie II had passed away allegedly without male issue, 
it being argued that the one surviving son, then a toddler, was not 
biologically his. That being accepted as a fact, and the toddler having 
in any event expired allegedly after an uncle had administered poisoned 
confectionary to him, customary law dictated that Griffith should only 
act as Regent and meantime devote his energies to raising seed for his 
late brother in the first house. Griffith rode against the spirit of 
customary law and wished instead to be appointed King in his own right, 
arguing that his faith in the Roman Catholic Church forbade him from 
fulfilling the customary role of raising seed for the deceased, but,
]ust the same, he meant to "sit on the throne with both buttocks." 
Jonathan's sin was that he protested against this position and, in fact 
refused even to participate in the selection. He was, however, outweighed 
by the rest of "the sons of Moshoeshoe" and, even more annoying, required 
to introduce the new Monarch to a national pitso. He duly introduced 
him, but in the same breath publicly said he did not know him."*'* Griffith 
never forgave him for that.
The animus between the two "Sons of Moshoeshoe“, then the two most 
powerful in Lesotho, was to generate constant conflicts. Suffice it here 
to mention the most immediate and illustrative. Early the following year, 
Griffith sought to test the disdainful uncle's loyalty by summoning him to
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his court in Matsieng in connection with administrative problems in his
District. According to the Cape Times, which monitored the succeeding
developments, Jonathan defied Griffith’s summons, saying he >rould not
"talk to a boy." The Chief was then 61 years of age, and the King was
44. Griffith followed through his summons by sending "several Chiefs
to Jonathan with a command. Their visit was also bootless, the
recalcitrant chief again refusing to obey." At last Griffith, following
an approval from the colonial administration, decided to descend on the
old man, "riding at the head of a large force to compel Jonathan to
submit to his authority ..." and "to bring (him) on his knees.” And only 
34then did Jonathan obey.
Jonathan so loathed the idea of being under Griffith’s authority that 
in 1916 he went to the lengths of petitioning the High Commissioner to 
recognise his District as an independent State, in view of the fact that 
"Griffith ... constantly trespasses and unlawfully interferes in your 
Petitioner's rights in Leribe . Although he was not successful with 
his petition, he was nevertheless not daunted. Cessation would be one 
of his goals until his death in 1937.
The combined effects of these dynastic feuds on Leribe were devastating 
The common people were tired of "bleeding” for Chiefs, in more ways than 
one. The feuds generated endless disputes over appropriated land and stock 
which, for their bulk and complexity courts could genuinely not handle.
Junior Chiefs went out of control and their seniors could not provide 
Commoners sufficient protection against them. None other than Chief 
Jonathan himself admitted by 1921 that "Leribe district is at present in 
a state of chaos. There is neither law nor order, the Government 
representative and myself being shown no respect by my under-chiefs ...”^
Albeit to a lesser degree, the situation was the same throughout the 
Territory.
Institutions of Government
Partially in response to the dynastic feuds, but also due to other factors, 
the indigenous institutions of government - the Grand Council and the 
pitso were also breaking down.
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It stands to reason that with so many factions within the "Sons 
of Moshoeshoe", there were very few instances when they could all assemble 
together and agree on matters of policy affecting the welfare of their 
subjects. Basically, the only issues that forced them to unite were 
those which constituted a common threat to them as a class. In the 
nineteenth century for instance, just before and after the passing of 
the Union Act of South Africa, they stuck together in the face of the 
menace of incorporation to the new white dominated state. No sooner 
than the threat was waived, however, they fell back to their respective 
factions.
Ttie same was the case when they were faced with a powerful, self-
assertive, non-Basotho chiefdom internally. In collaboration with the
colonial administration, they kept 18 senior members of the royal
house of the Chiefdom of Baphuthi, then the most powerful in Lesotho,
for sixteen years under forced restriction at the capital in Maseru,
away from their ancestral lands in Phamong, in the Mohale's Hoek District.
When, back in 1899 King Lerotholi had placed his son and future King
Griffith over them, the Baphuthi had resented the move and rebelled in
arms against it. From 1900 to 1902 they had been imprisoned for two
years without a trial and subsequently released to live in Maseru under
government rations. But as late as in 1916 the "Sons of Moshoeshoe"
and the colonial administration still equally felt that the Baphuthi
royal house constituted a "danger” against them and they were weighing
the equally extreme measures of either banishing them to Matebeleland in
Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) or else settling them on a hardly habitable
place on top of Mount Qeme in the Maseru District. The Baphuthi royal
house was only granted a safe return to its ancestral lands after its head
Mocheko had renounced his original status as Principal Chief, at the same
37level as Jonathan, Maama and others, in the Territory.
Save on such and similar issues the Grand Council had lost its 
teeth; so much so that the King found himself referring matters to 
colonial Officers which even under classical indirect rule should have 
been settled by or contained within. the Council. About the year
1898 or 1899, for instance, Lerotholi had "begged" the then Resident 
Commissioner Sir Godfrey Lagden "to intervene" between his son and heir
9
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Letsie II and his principal wife Mahali because the heir had for some
two years since their marriage defaulted in his conjugal obligations,
preferring the permanent company of one of his late grandfather 
38Letsie I's younger wives. The Queen, Mahali, had personally in
1912 begged the High Commissioner, Gladsone "to grant me a hearing
as the principal wife ..." as "I have for several years been denied the 
privileges of my rank ..." From 1898 or 1899 until Letsie II‘s death in
1913 the Grand Council failed in one of its major responsibilities of 
insuring a smooth succession for the Nation's sake. One King had had
to "beg" the colonial administration to assist him with a very delicate matter
that only the royal house should have known. Having failed, the Queen
had felt compelled to bring her intimate problems to a white "Chief"
who naturally could only tell her that "the matter is one in which I am 
40unable to interfere." The end result was Griffith's problematic 
succession.
By the year 1900 the national pitso had also degenerated considerably,
In Moshoeshoe's times, according to the French missionary Eugene Casalis
the pitso had been a singularly democratic institution. A subject of
discussion was normally put to the people by one of the King's courtiers,
"taking care to let his own personal opinion appear as little as possible."
That done, the pitso was open to any one to speak. Those with the gift
of speech aired their views "with the greatest freedom and plainess of
speech." It was expected on such an occasion that the sovereign "must
hear the most cutting remarks without a frown." There were always those
who were for and others who were against the government. At the end the
King summarised the arguments, presented his own, and then sought to
create consensus. And if the pitso was in agreement with his summary, it
41signified it with an applause. Elsewhere Casalis further informs us 
that indeed4^
Freedom of thought and freedom of 
speech are the foundations and the 
guarantee of the national rights 
of (Moshoeshoe's ) subjects. They 
are allowed to express their 
opinion on the Chief's conduct 
quite openly; if they disapprove 
of it, they say so with a virile 
and eloquent boldness which the 
fiery Roman tribune would have 
envied.
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What, then, happened to the institution when Lesotho had become a 
colonial state.
Briefly, it was perverted. And here the greater share of the
blame lay on the colonial administration. Colonial officers turned it,
initially in the 1870's during the period of the Cape administration,
into a forum where they introduced their distinguished guests into the
Territory and for purposes of reading their already decided policies and
Regulations. Between the outbreak of the Gun War and the re-annexation
to the Crown in 1884 it became a sheer mockery of democratic principles.
Particularly under the administration of the hard-nosed Governor’s
Agent (a designation which was turned to Resident Commissioner after
1884) named Blyth, Chiefs and their King were harrangued, threatened
and humiliated. In one pitso in 1883, in particular, Blyth so put
the fear of the Lord in Letsie I that the King cringed and began
apologetically to say MI am stupid ..." and "He who is a coward is not
43left in the chair ..." Much to the mortification of his subjects.
Thus, when General Charles Gordon, a senior Officer who had been sent 
by the Colonial Office in London as a trouble shooter in the post-war years, 
asked the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society in Lesotho if the pitso 
might not be put to more effective use in the administration of the 
Territory he replied: "The chiefs have never much liked the yearly
44meetings held by the Government  " and they were loath to attend them.
This new style of using the pitso, however, rubbed on to the majority 
of Basotho Chiefs in the course of the nineteenth century. In their own 
District lipitso (plural) the potentates became intolerant of differences 
of view. By the year 1900 the institution had become a farce.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
The political factors, however, need to be viewed in close 
relationship with the obstrusive economic and social factors that had 
simultaneously been undermining the structure of the indigenous 
government. For, without the second, the first set of factors will, 
necessarily, understate the problem. The twain were inseparable.
The Economic Factors
The Annexation of Lesotho to the Cape Colony in 1871 brought with
it the introduction into the Territory of a compulsory form of taxation 
called the "hut tax” (that is, house tax). The formula was that each 
married adult male should be taxed 10s for each wife. As each adult 
Mosotho male was customarily allotted a piece of land for cultivation 
only upon marriage, this meant in essence that the "hut" was as much a 
"land" tax. And further, and more insidiously in the polygamous Basotho 
society, it meant that a married man bore the burden of the tax in 
relation to the number of wives (or pieces of agricultural land) that 
he had - up to the maximum number of three.
The Chiefly lot, members of which had the most number of wives, were 
hardest hit by this tax. The wives of senior Chiefs ran into scores.
Kings Letsie I and Lerotholi, for instance, had 104 and 68 wives,
45respectively. At the early age of 38, in 1882, Chief Jonathan had
46already 33 wives (with a total of 211 children). He still had 45
47years left for more. And Chief Maama had 15. By the start of the 
twentieth century there were about 16 senior Chiefs with a similar 
marriage propensity. Hence, it is reasonable to say every Chief had 
at least three wives.
In the effort to raise this tax and still maintain the regal life, 
the potentates seem to have justified breaking the customary rule guiding 
the use of matsema - reguired labour in the cultivation of Chiefs' fields. 
The numerous junior Chiefs below followed suit. So that at the end 
Commoners found themselves hopping from one Chief's piece of land to the 
other's and hardly having enough time to attend to their own.
The matsema had always been one of the Chiefs' primary mechanisms of 
control on Commoners. Thus Chief Masopha could say in 1872, when the
49Governor's Agent Griffith proposed to do away with them, that they were
... a bridle which the chiefs held 
in their people's mouths, by which 
they retained their authority 
over them, and that if this 
bridle was taken out of their 
mouths, they would no longer have 
authority or control over the 
people.
The matsema's extended use, however, proved to be a bridle too tight
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in the people's mouths. It generated their resentment and ilienation 
from Chiefs.
This alienation was further reinforced by the method u4ed to collect
the tax. From its inception the “hut tax" was collected through Chiefs
and Headmen. As an inducement for efficient collection, tke King and
his senior Chiefs in particular were given allowances for tiheir services.
So that as early as in 1883 we find, for instance, in the iame
correspondence in which he was attempting to rebut the accusation that
it was due to his weakness as a monarch that the Gun war had broken out,
King Letsie X pleading with his Governor's Agent to regularise his
share of the "hut tax" allowance. The Governor's Agent had the
satisfaction to remind him that he had "hardly brought his influence
to induce the people to pay" the tax, besides, he said, he had just
"received £100, in November and £70 in June last . Later in 1884
King Lerotholi would similarly be pleading for an increase of what he then
called his "salary" of £1,000 per annum.^ So that by the end of the
nineteenth century the colonial administration had sufficient confidence
in its financial control of Chiefs to consider "a gradual reduction" of
their allowances "by time and a fixing of our attention upon those who
52are responsible and competent to carry out orders." The dependence of 
the King and his Chiefs on this allowance made them feel increasingly 
economically indebted to the colonial administration. The outcome was that 
as the Chiefs gradually turned their misfortune into a privilege, their 
political bond with Commoners through the misuse of matsema was, however, 
only a part, and a minor part of a larger economic syndrome in which the 
Territory was caught up. Lesotho was going through an agrarian 
revolution. And the revolution was occuring alongside the development 
of labour migration to-the surrounding settler colonies - the Orange 
Free State, Cape Colony and the Transvaal.
Mainly due to the missionary encouragement for industriousness and 
market production which had begun in Moshoeshoe's times, and casually 
from the acquisition of the plough, which replaced the less efficient 
Basotho hoe, the wagon for quicker transport, the introduction of better 
seeds in particular wheat as a cash crop, and better methods of 
cultivation, Lesotho had by 1865 become the grain basket of South Africa. 
The three years' war with the Orange Free State Boer from 1865 to 1868
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interrupted and virtually destroyed that development. In the words
of or\e member of the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society, "there
was hardly a single village which was not burned down ..." in the
course of the hostilities. "The ploughs and wagons disappeared;
all the herds of large and small stock which had not been captured by the
enemy, were eaten."55 In the course of the war the Nation had lost
two provinces, many families were decimated, and a considerable number
of inhabitants had emigrated. The population had dropped down from
54between 150 - 180,000 in 1865 to 125,000 in 1869. Albeit, once the 
Nation had settled down in the 1870's, coincidentally with the discovery 
of minerals in the surrounding white settler colonies, agrarian production 
doubled its momentum. In 1875 there were 300 wagons and about 3,000 
ploughs in Lesotho, then with a population of 127,323 inhabitants.55 
One could see "inumerable fields of grain extending in every direction ..." 
Lesotho was "traversed in every direction by wagons of traders who, 
in exchange for their money and their commercial wares ..." conveyed 
wheat and maize "to the diamond fields and the Free State."57
The King of Basotho and his Chiefs were the greatest benefactors 
from this agrarian revolution. They exerted their full authority on 
Commoners and appropriated the biggest and most fertile pieces of land 
to themselves to produce for the market. They developed the love of money
and European goods that money could buy. The economic and social gap
between themselves and Commoners increased. Chiefs were losing 
contact with the rest of the Nation below them.
At the same time, dialectically, the same factors - money and
accumulation of European goods, gave Commoners independence from the 
Chiefs. Christian communities around mission stations in particular, 
which since Moshoeshoe's times had fallen under missionary influence and 
political control away from their Chiefs, profitted from the agrarian 
revolution and used their profit to establish small business and to give 
their children higher education outside the country, mainly in the Cape 
Cplony. Their children became teachers, clerks for the colonial 
administration, and interpreters for senior colonial officers.
The less privileged Commoners, mostly non-Christians, would find 
their escape from the grip of Chiefs through that otherwise economically
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debilitating trend that was developing and undermining the agrarian boom.
In 1873 there were already some 30,000 Basotho out of Lesotho working
in Kimberly and elsewhere in the settler colonies. And by 1877 some
5,000 Basotho were working in the railway works in the Cape Colony alone.
Migrancy would take a more virulent form in the 1880's. When, due to
the combined effects of a general depression in South Africa, the closing
of the grain market to the diamond fields, the Free State and the Cape
58Colony destroyed the agrarian boom in the Territory. Justifying the
vicious effects of labour migration in those years, the Civil Commissioner
in Kimberly would say that it would teach "natives ... the advantages of
civilization, to create in them confidence in the justice of the white
man and if it be possible to awaken in them something akin to gratitude 
59for benefits received." While the Resident Commissioner of Lesotho, Sir 
Godfrey Lagden in 1898 commented with satisfaction that:^
Though for its size and population 
Basutoland produces a comparatively 
enormous quantity of grain, it has 
an industry of great economic value 
to South Africa, viz., the output 
of native labour. It supplies the 
sinews of agriculture in the Orange 
Free State; to a large extent it 
keeps going railway works, coal 
mining, the diamond mines at 
Jagersfontein and Kimberly, and 
furnishes, in addition, a large 
proportion of domestic servants 
in the surrounding territories.
Pulled by the labour market to satisfy new needs and requirements such as 
tax, and not so perseeptive of the damaging effects of migration on their 
country, the poorer Commoners enjoyed the bit of money that was there to 
be had. They bought what they could afford of the European goods and 
build mordern houses to enhance their status. Their periodic removal 
from the country provided them some respite from their increasingly 
irresponsible and non-responsive Chiefs. The remaining grip that the latter 
still had on them was the allocation of land and administration of 
justice for their disputes.
The Social Factors
Although in a sense social factors have already been touched upon, two
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problems of great significance would appear still to need a separate 
mention. One was the introduction of the white man's drink, whisky. The 
other was the general impact of Western civilization and Christianity 
on the moral fabric of society.
The discipline of Chiefs was greatly damaged by the infusion of the
white man's drink. Even under the strict control of the colonial
administration, for which intemperance generated the equally irksome
problems of lawlessness as it did for the indigenous rulers, brandy was
smuggled from the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony by white traders
of few scrupples through various secret devices to escape the vigilance
of Border Police patrols in Lesotho, preponderantly from the 1880's. In
turn Chiefs cooperated by setting up canteens throughout the country for 
61its consumption.
The hardest hit sector of society was the Chiefs themselves, people
with the money to buy it. Kings Letsie 1, Lerotholi and Letsie 11, Chief
Masopha and his heir Lepoqo, to name a few, were so regularly inebriated that
they often delegated their responsibilities to their Councillors. Letsie 1
could figuratively say to a colonial Officer in 1880 that his son Lerotholi
was "mad from drinking.” ^  Lepoqo, by his own father's admission, died
in 1886 from the effects of the drink.^ While an intelligence report by
the South African Government, which feared a rebellion from Basotho in
event of an adumbrate plan to incorporate their country to the new Union
concluded in 1909: "Out of the sixteen Chiefs ... the principal ones are
64drunkards ..." The heirs as well as other favourite sons of these 
polygamous Chiefs, most of whom already had their own carefakings in the 
Territory in which they were judges of courts (and who therefore I 
classify as junior Chiefs), were in no less a state of sobriety. Such 
Chiefs were hardly in a position to acquit themselves in their offices as 
efficiently as the pre-cclonial order had been able to.
Suffice it to say then that, by the end of the nineteeth century the 
indigenous government of colonial Lesotho had, for all intents and purposes, 
broken down. Society in general had loosened from the various mentioned 
factors. And to no less a degree it had loosened from the effects of 
Western civilization and Christianity. To borrow two statements from 
a spokesman of the latter, made in 1885:
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Basotho are no longer what they were 
at the arrival of the missionaries.
• They then possessed a distinctive
civilization, no doubt primitive, 
doubtless limited but, for that very 
reason, perfect for its kind, and 
presenting the phenomenon which 
is equally observable in other 
heathen civilizations of a certain 
ideal actually attained.
Under the dissolving influence of 
civilization and Christianity - 
for the latter has also had its 
share in this process of 
demolition - these ancient 
barriers of the patriarchal 
institutions were shaken; the 
antique severity of the customs 
has softened; the bonds of 
discipline have slackened ...
This is more especially true 
of the Basuto established 
abroad, in the Colony or in the 
Free State, or of those who 
have been under the influence 
of Christianity but without 
receiving it in their hearts, 
and who have more or less 
emancipated themselves from 
the ancient native discipline 
and its wholesome restraints, 
without the old order of things 
having been^eplaced ... by 
a new one.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL AND THE ONSET OF A 
POLITICAL STRUGGLE BETVEEN CHIEFS AND COMMONERS
If it had not been clear to Chiefs in general in the nineteenth 
century that the indigenous government held broken down, King Lerotholi 
tacity acknowledged that reality at the start of the twentieth century.
In 1903 he agreed to a long-standing and oft-repeated suggestion by the 
colonial administration to reconstitute his Chiefs into a new institution 
called a National Council. The idea had first been mooted in 1883, but 
throughout the reminder of the nineteenth century Basotho Kings were
nervous about it, suspecting it to be a potential instrument of their
66control. In the course of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902), however.
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Lerotholi changed his mind. He was himself considerably ill during that
period. His personal constitution was strained to the limits by perpetual
dynastic feuds. In his son and heir, Letsie 11, he had an exceedingly
weak successor. The King's son indulged excessively in the white man's 
67drink. His interest in the affairs of the state was feeble.
The National Council was supposed to take the place of the customary 
pitso. It was a Council of hundred. Ninety four of these were appointees 
of the King and they were either Chiefs or their representatives, mostly 
Chiefs' courtiers. The four others, all four Commoners, were appointees 
of the Resident Commissioner, on the advice of the Paris Evangelical 
Missionary Society. The Resident Commissioner was the President of the 
Council, and the King of Basotho was his "Chief Councillor”.
The National Council, as stated in Section 7 of its Regulations, was
a consultative body "on any new laws of a domestic nature which may be
proposed and its expression of opinion thereon be submitted to the 
68High Commissioner." According to Section 11 of the Regulations:
"Relations with neighbouring States, questions or extradition or the 
prerogative or authority of the Crown are outside the province of the 
C o u n c i l . T h e  Council, however, would not have statutary force until 
1910.
In recognition of the fact that the most pressing problem in the 
indigenous government was lack of justice in the courts, the first and major 
task of the National Council at its first session in 1903 was to codify 
customary law. Councillor Dichaba Labane of Mafeteng moved on July 8 
"that the Sons of Moshoeshoe be instructed to write the old laws of 
Moshesh." And Josias Mopeli suggested that a Committee of 24 was duly 
formed, comprised of men some of whom claimed to have known and worked 
with the revecad King Moshoeshoe, to deliberate on and produce a code of 
customary law. The result was 24 laws, not all of ancient origin. These 
were deliberated on for six days and at the end reduced to eighteen. In 
the traditional fashion, they were named after the reigning Basotho 
monarch as the Laws of Lerotholi, and subsequently published under a green 
cover from which they got their nickname - Matalenyane: "the little 
green book".
In approving those Laws, the Chiefs were generally in agreement that
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the unwritten Basotho law had well nigh fallen into disuse and that the 
greatest transgressors of that law were Chiefs themselves. As the 
President of the Council stated in his summary of the proceedings, the 
Laws of Lerotholi were made “with the object of checking the arbitrary 
conduct of those chiefs who, influenced by greed, gain, or love of power, 
had abused their positions, and departed from the unwritten, but well 
understood, code of native custom." "There was even a desire shown by 
many councillors, that more definite punishment should be prescribed for 
those Chiefs who neglected, or broke, certain of these rules."71 Ironically, 
when the Reforms of 1938 did come, they as a recognition, to no less a 
degree attested to by Chiefs themselves, that that noble step had failed to 
right the situation. By 1903 the waning of responsibility and 
responsiveness toward Commoners had already taken an irreversible turn. 
Confrontation was inevitable.
The conflict of interests between Chiefs and Commoners which would lead 
to a collision began in the political sphere. It was a conflict for power. 
And that conflict centred around the role of the National Council, the new 
institution of the indigenous government.
The first explicit and methodical criticism of Chiefs by Commoners
came in the middle of 1904 in a Sesotho newspaper, Naledi, first published
by the educated elite that year. A critic under the nom de plume "Mohlori"
- "the Lonely/Persecuted One" - indicated the National Council as a
"Parliament" merely of Chiefs. "At that," he asked, rhetorically, "have
they been chosen by the Nation, by vote?" Further elaborating on that point 
72"Mohlori" stated:
Now these men who have not been chosen 
by the Nation go to Parliament at the 
end of the year, to say what? Only they 
know, as even in the course of the year 
they never convene meetings with men of 
the District from which they come so that 
they may hear what they say and what 
(those men) wish to be brought to the 
attention of Parliament. There they go, 
these men who have been appointed by 
one person to speak at this Council 
which is said to be respectable, as 
some of us know that it is the 
foundation of a strong government, 
when it is run properly.
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In 1907 Naledi featured another article which took the criticism a 
step further. The article, by F. Seele, suggested
This is, indeed, a Council of 
Chiefs. They are the ones who 
requested it and it was given 
to them, hence it is in order 
that only they should run it.
If the Nation would like 
participation in Government, 
it should request for its own 
Council.
Thus, in Seele's thinking, and in the thinking of others of his 
persuation, the era of Chiefs as rulers had run it course. Commoners 
needed their own Council, the only one that could be said to represent 
"the Nation".
Although this suggestion had come from a member of the educated
elite, quite significantly it would be championed by a sector of
society which represented different interests altogether. It would be
taken up by Josiel Lefela, an activist Commoner from Mapoteng, in the
District of Leribe, and member of the National Council appointed by
the Resident Commissioner. Lefela would even later found an Association
which would make him extremely unpopular both with the Chiefs and, equally,
with the colonial administration. The role of that Association in the
74politics of Lesotho is soon to be told, and so I will not elaborate on 
it in the present task.
Albeit, determined to establish themselves as a political force 
Commoners, between 1907 and 1919, organised themselves into pressure groups. 
The first of these, founded in 1907, was the Basutoland Progressive 
Association. Founded by an ex-government interpreter and Resident 
Commissioner's appointee to the National Council, Simon Majakathata 
Phamotse from the Leribe District, the Progressive Association was by 
and large comprised of the educated elite - government interpreters, 
established Ministers of the Gospel mainly belonging to the Paris 
Evangelical Missionary Society, writers like the distingushed Thomas 
Mofolo and Z. Mangoaela, teachers, and the well-to-do businessmen. It 
was Western in its thinking. And while generally professing to be loyal to
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all authority, it felt more comfortable associating with the colonial 
administration than it did with Chiefs. The latter it viewed as not only 
corrupt but also backward and ignorant.
The second was the Lekhotla la Bafo - "Commoner's Council". Founded 
by Josiel Lefela in 1909, Lekhotla la Bafo's political base was in the rural 
area. It encompassed the disaffected, poorer Basotho, the landless 
spasmodic migrant labourers with a preference for the Fatherland as opposed 
to the South African labour camps, members of independent Churches, 
prophets - who often led prayers in major assemblies, disgruntled junior Chi 
with an axe to grind with their seniors, and quite significantly in a 
male dominated society, women. Josiel Lefela had not attained the 
Standard VI education, the starting point for the educated elite in the 
counterpart Association, although he had evidently mastered records, 
including treaties, on Lesotho more effectively than them, to the point 
of quoting pages and pages from the standard documentary literature 
Basutoland Records. While critical of Chiefs and considering that 
something had to be done to restore their calibre of leadership to what 
it had been in the pre-colonial days, the Association did not have an 
immediate programme for their reform. Yet, it was clear that chieftaincy 
should be retained. Its more vitriolic attacks were on the colonial 
administration and on imperialism in general. Equally, the Association 
was unsparing in its indictment of the organised Christian Church. As 
Lefela said in his annual address in 1929:7^
Missionaries, who have entered our 
countries under the guise of the 
messenger of God to preach the 
Gospel to all nations of the world, 
are the pioneers and heralds of the 
pernicious capitalist and 
imperialistic forward march which 
blasts every thing comes its way.
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Coincidentally with the founding of Lekhotla la Bafo, Josiel Lefela
got kieked out ofthe National Council m  1920. Hated by both the
colonial administration and the indigenous government for his criticisms
against both in the National Council, he had for some time been a
potential victim. The opportunity presented itself in September 1920
when he contributed an article in Naledi which mortified Puritan
sensibility and embarrassed Chiefs. He referred to the newly formed
chapter of the Y.W.C.A. in Johannesburg as "a home for Christian whores,
young and old to whore in." In Lefela's view the Christian Association
was "the way ourpeople will be put and end to ... so that in ten years
76time the black races would diminish and half-castes increase." That 
was taken as sufficient ground for his expulsion.
Combining their efforts in reaction to Lefela's expulsion from 
the National Council, the Progressive Association and the Lekhotla la 
Bafo retorted in March 1921:
If the President desired to exercise his authority 
over the Council which has lain dormant for many 
years why in all goodness did he not start by 
suspending thieves, murders and law-breakers (Chiefs) 
who consi^ute a majority of the Council? He is 
pleased to listen to the advice of such outcasts and 
confer with them in matters of theft, murder and law 
breaking, but shuns the society of a man who fights 
tooth and nail against such barbarities ....
It is simply scandalous:
THE FAILURE OF THE LAWS OF LEROTHOLI AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF 
AGITATION FOR REFORMS
Only five years after the approval of the Laws of Lerotholi, m  
1908 Chiefs in the National Council were admitting to one another that
their proud code of customary law had not resolved their impasse. The
problem of injustices m  Basotho courts became a repeated topic of 
discussion in almost every session of the National Council thereafter.
In 1918, for instance, Chiefs Makhaola and Sekhonyana, the two leading 
members of the King's judicial court in Matsieng admitted that Chiefs
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had become irresponsible in their administration of justice. There 
were inordinate delays in the trial of cases. In most cases Chiefs 
were not there to preside over their own courts. One other Chief
even admitted that "some men of the courts were bribed to try cases
.78 quickly."
At the start of the third decade of the twentieth century
Commoners’ various charges, in and outside the National Council,
escalated. And then they led to a head-on collision with Chiefs.
It all began with the publication in the Bloemfontein (Union of South
Africa) newspaper The Friend in December 1921 of two aggressive
articles against the court system. One writer, under the pseudonym
"Mosotho" charged in general that Chiefs had in effect "turned the
Basotho into a nation of slaves." They made them to work in the
fields of their “several wives without food or payment or even a drink
of water." "Moshotho" alleged that some people had been killed by
frolicking "young chiefs" in a spate of lawlessness by indigenous
rulers. As a rule, he said, court cases were awaited to stockpile
before trial began. Yet, in the event a litigant lost heart and
disappeared from the court, judgement was brought against him and he
was fined for contempt of court. People could not even have their
cases allowed on appeal to higher courts. When they attempted to
appeal, higher Chiefs’s courts returned them to courts of first
instance. "Moshotho" let it be known that his article was aimed at
the white public in general and colonial authorities in Lesotho in
particular as a strategy to expose "the great misuse of justice as
carried out by the Chiefs of Basutoland" from whom "we groan
under a burden of oppression." And he hoped that as a result of his
agitation a "Commission of Enquiry" into his allegations might be 
79established.
A fortnight later, Simon Majakathata Phamotse followed. Also 
featured in The Friend, Simon Majakathatha said indeed any Mosotho 
"would be wanting in patriotism were he to fail to endorse" the 
anonymous "Mosotho" on the question of the "uneven balance"
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of justice m  the Territory Chiefs, he said, ran their courts 
with extreme subjectivity and vindictiveness, and that they each had 
a "black list" of Commoners in their jurisdictions. In reaction to 
such a state of affairs, Basotho throughout the Territory were 
"clamouring for reform of some kind or other." He hoped, he said, 
to "gam the ear of high officials and to draw public attention to 
this woeful state of affairs in this our fair little country." And 
as a first step, Majakathata proposed the establishment of a 
Department of Justice for Lesotho which should be presided over by an 
"experienced and qualified judge" and which should "have nothing to 
do with political affairs."^0 His was, in that sense, the first 
suggestion from a Mosotho for a separation of powers in the customary 
functions of Chiefs.
Then a barrage of newspaper charges followed in Naledi and 
Mochochono through February of the following year 1922. At one time 
it was Simon Phamotse once again. At another, somebody who called
himself "Another Mosotho". And at yet another time it was an anony­
mous "Mohlouoa" - "The-Hated-One". The punch line from these
critics, following which Chiefs felt compelled to react, was carried
8 1in a leading article in fJaledi on February 24, and it read:
I am sure neither of our Paramount Chiefs... know anything 
of the Proclamation No. 2B, 1884, Section 4 . To their 
knowledge and belief every male child born of a woman
whose dowry was paid with cattle belonging to Moshoesh's
estate is ipso facto a chief with the right to adjudicate 
upon and try any case, criminal or civil, and to exercise 
jurisdiction within such limits as may be idefinitely 
defined by his superior ... The condition of affairs in 
the country are (sic) going to the dogs all because the 
Resident Commissioner will not make use of this power ... 
(Yet),in order to save the Basuto chieftainship from 
sure destruction to which it is now speeding headlong, 
and to have justice and freedom in the country, some way 
must be found out of the deadlock.
Exposed and driven to the wall. Chiefs reacted with vigour and 
venom to the articles. ling Griffith Lerotholi convened a huge pitso
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at the royal residence in Matsieng at which, one in a few, "the 
Sons of Moshoeshoe" were fully represented, and he summoned Simon 
Majakathata and his followers to come and speak to their various 
charges against his government. Probably the longest in the century 
to date, the pit3Q lasted for 8 days from April 18th to the 25th.
According to The Friend, which covered the event, the spokes­
men of the Progressive Association - Simon Majakathata, C.H. Mofokeng 
and the novelists, Thomas Mofolo and Z.D. Mangoaela underwent "a 
severe cross-examination as to which Chiefs were accused ...." 
Certainly a tricky procedure, and one fraught with danger for those 
asked. The spokesmen refused to fall for the bait, promising, 
instead, to name names only in a proper trial court and not a pitso. 
The King would not fall for their strategy either. Backed up by 
150 members of the Association alone, Phamotse and his men were 
obviously feeling triumphant throughout the duration of the pitso. 
"The meeting was constantly interrupted by voices from the crowd, 
which formed a ring supporting the Association's spokesmen, and
deriding the Chiefs," although the owners of the voices could not be
8 1identified. And at the end of the pitso:
Women of the Paramount Chief's village came to shake 
hands with the President of the Association, whom 
they called their Moses and to whom they turned their 
eyes for their salvation and the salvation of the 
country. Many women sat at the approaches of the 
village, just to see "the one who had come to deliver 
them" and newly born infants there were named after 
him.
The triumph, however, was commingled with trepidation. For, as 
Simon Majakathata and Thomas Mofolo later informed the Resident 
Commissioner, to whom they had repaired for protection, the King 
had concluded the pitso by warning them "that we must never organise
in the villages of the chiefs and headmen, for we shall meet with
82accidents which will cause him trouble."
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Summarising the views of the Association on the role of Chiefs
in government, following that confrontation, Simon Majakathata stated,
83in an evident display of bravado and learning:
True to their habitual indifference, born of years of 
unlimited authority and indulgent luxury, (Chiefs) very 
soon got over the shock they had received when their 
incorporation (to the Union of South Africa)... was first 
mooted.... For over ten years, the Basutoland Chiefs 
have been callous to the cries and grievances of their 
people. ...History is truly repeating itself in the case 
of Basutoland. All the incidents which happened in the 
reign of King John and King Charles in connection with 
the trampling down of the people's rights (in England), 
by both the Kings, have taken place in the reign of the
present King of Basutoland....  Like the English of old,
the Basuto love their kings and will think twice before 
they declare against them. But the love is only on one 
side. The King and his barons show no reciprocity of 
that love, all they do is maltreat them, dispense uneven 
justice and make them slaves for them, without any 
recompense.
THE COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION TAKES THE INITIATIVE FOR REFORMS
It has to be admitted that until 1921 the colonial administration 
had lost control of the running of the “Colony". It had no general 
policy. It had no immediate plan to deal with the state of affairs as 
it was being described in the newspapers. Quite daunting, following 
the spate of articles in 1921 - 1922, the Resident Contnissioner,
Colonel E.C.F. Sarraway, advised his High Commissioner in a confiden­
tial memorandum on February 18, 1922 that he had confirmed the 
existence of Section 4 of the Proclamation No. 2B 1884. It did give 
the colonial administration the necessary powers to intervene, but to 
his consternation "in no case have the conditions laid down therein 
been enforced," although the principal law was 37 years old.8^
The Resident Commissioner thought the members of the 
Progressive Association were handling the crisis in the right direction 
and he believed that "by a judicious handling of some" of the members
- 32 .
of the National Council Chiefs might be made aware of the fact that
complaints against them had already reached the Secretary of State
and were printed in a number of English papers. Beyond that, the only
other thing in his view which might be tried was along the lines of
Phamotse's proposal for a new judiciary body. The proposal, in its
modified form, was for the establishment of a Court of Appeal for
appellants against judgements given in the various Chiefs' courts,
to consist of a President, who would be an Assistant Commissioner of
the District of parties in dispute, plus 7 members, one from each of
7 Districts of Lesotho then. In any event, cautioned the Resident 
84Commissioner:
The suggestion for this innovation should emanate from 
the nation itself, and not be thrust on them by the 
Government. I think that a motion introducing the 
suggestion could be arranged for the next Session of 
the Basutoland Council (i.e. 1923)
Seeing the innovation as undermining the role of his own court 
in Matsieng, King Griffith rejected the idea outright. A fresh start 
had to be made. And this time the colonial administration decided 
to take the bull by the horns and introduce reforms directly.
Having gained the impression that Chiefs had at last accepted 
their failure to deal with their own administrative and judicial 
problems and that they would welcome intervention by the colonial 
administration, the new Resident Commissioner, J.C.R. Sturrock set 
about drafting a lengthy set of Regulations in 1927. He subsequently 
circulated these for comments throughout the territory. He would 
present them to the National Council in October 1929, as a last step 
before passing them to the High Commissioner for proclamation. As he 
pointed out to his High Commissioner in June 1928, Chiefs were ready 
for reforms: "Practically all councillors save one, who is closely 
connected with the Paramount Chief's Court, have admitted it in my 
, 85hearing in Council."
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Just at that point, however, Lekhotla la Bafo reversed the
tide". The relations with of Lekhotla la Bafo and the Progressive
Association had soured and were at their worst in those years.
Basically this was due to the fact that Lefela had come to believe
that the members of the rival Progressive Association were politically
disoriented and were agents of imperialism. Scoffing at their 
86education he said:
...it is not an exaggeration that defective education 
is worse than illiteracy because of its misleading 
effects, and diseased knowledge is poison to every 
healthy mind or brain, that is why our so-called
educated in Basutoland are not able to distinguish
bread coated with political poison from bread without 
poison.
Partly to foil their coveted reforms, therefore, and partly from the 
genuine fear that the Nation would be deprived of its natural 
leadership, Lekhotla la Bafo initiated a compaign a few weeks before 
the Draft Regulations were to be discussed in the National Council, 
in defence of Chiefs. Going back to the old question of the 
constitutional status of the territory, Lefela argued that Lesotho 
was a Protectorate. The colonial administration, he said, had been 
sent to protect his country. In the event, he was appalled in 1929 
to find that colonial Officers were bent on the "breaking down of 
our social fabric to bring about the detribalisation of our political 
existence as a nation... in the vilification and pollution of our 
chiefs by the>officers of the Government through enmeshing them in 
judicial manoeuvres directed against them to prepare for their 
expulsion from posts of exercising their duties as judges for their
,.87 people..."
Largely owing tothis ammunition, and to no less a degree because 
Lekhotla la Bafo obviously also prepared the strategy, when the 
Regulations were brought for discussion in the National Council in 
October 1929, Chiefs torpeioed them out. The strategy was to knock
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down the centre pin of the Draft Regulations, namely the enabling
Proclamation 2B of 1884. In a typical Josiel Lefela fashion, the
Chiefs argued that Proclamation 2B was a Cape Colony law and not one
of the British Government, and hence it was null and void. The
contrary was the ja3e, but the new Resident Corrmissioner did not know
his facts. Further, again one of Lefela's pet arguments; Chiefs asked
the Resident Commissioner if he was familiar with what they termed
the Treaty of Mokema, by which Moshoeshoe and Wodehouse had agreed
that Lesotho would be a Protectorate and submitted that the Treaty
had been reduced to writing. No such a "Treaty" existed. But,
ignorant of the fact, Resident Commissioner Sturrock admitted confusion
and virtually threw in the towel. He did so when he granted the
Chiefs leave to go and consult the Nation. Five days later the Chiefs
came back to say they had held public assemblies throughout the
country (11,700 sq miles) and the Nation was in agreement with them
88that they did not want his Regulations.
But, that grievances existed,was admitted by none other than 
Lekhotla la Bafo, which pointed out just a year later in 1930: "The
treatment or the chiefs upon the people is most vexatious and...you 
all see that our success in repelling the proposed regulations for 
the abolition of hereditary chieftainship is no better than an 
..®9ephemeral success ...."
Indeed, the success was ephemeral. Effectively beginning in 
1931, the Resident Commissioner established a procedure of consultation 
between Chiefs and Commoners. Before as after each session of the 
National Council, Chiefs were to hold meetings with their people in 
the respective Districts from which they brought motions on subjects 
affecting their welfare. The procedure established a measure of 
accountability between the rulers and their subjects, but it also placed 
Chiefs in the awkward position of having to introduce to the Council 
motions from a majority of Commoners who indicted them for mal­
administration and injustices in their courts. At the same time
35
the Progressive Association kept up its agitation for reforms. The
situation was made desparate by Lekhotla la Bafo which began to
refer to the colonial administration and Chiefs as egually "our 
90enemy". Suffering from the acute disability from a section of the 
Nation, of being seen as having no legitimacy to office, King Griffith 
Lerotholi was in no position to intervene in the historical process.
Thus, when Labane Chokobane moved the motion for the famous or
infamous Proclamations No. 61 and No. 62 m  the National Council on
November 17, 1937, the position of the indigenous rulers was aptly
91summarised by Chief Lengolo Monyake of Taung, who stated:
The Chief and the people are egual, if the Chief goes 
one way and the people go in the opposite direction there 
must be a collision somewhere. There are some Councillors 
who seem to think that in order to remain Councillors 
they must keep on saying the Paramount Chief is good .- 
how long are we going to be hoodwinked:Ckir position is 
becoming insecure. You want us to continue to play with 
matters until we are pushed over the precipice. This 
nation of beer drinkers and dagga smokers, as it is 
called, I have heard that they have a grievance. This 
is a curse which even comes up in the Paramount Chief's 
Court that we are beer drinkers and dagga smokers. You 
should listen to the cry of the nation: the people are 
crying to you, Chief of the Basuto, they want you to 
stand up on your feet to support yourself and the people 
will stand by you to the end....When the people say a 
certain thing is bad do you think we play with matters?
The people who say they will protect you will be the 
first to run away.
The Reforms gained the force of law in 1938. They were only a refined 
version of the Draft Regulations of 1929 and the work of the colonial 
administration. But the impetus for their introduction had come from
Commoners.
SUMMARY
The Reforms of 1938 were the culmination of a historical 
process. From the 1 11-defined const:tutionalstatus of Lesotho under 
the British Crown an unsystematic product of parallel government had
36
resulted. The indigenous government was by and large in charge of 
the internal affairs of the territory. Under a combination of 
factors, some of which were inherent in the pre-colonial structure 
of rule, while others represented the contraditions of the colonial 
situation, it broke down. Chiefs lost touch with Commoners. 
Resentful of chiefly abuses, Commoners demanded political change, 
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